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THE REGIONAL SECURITY COMPLEX OF 
SOUTH AMERICA: AN ANALYSIS FROM 





 The present article is a result of an investigation about the Regional 
Security Complex (RSC) of South America, which is implied in the discus-
sions about defense and security in the region, more specifically, since the 
creation of the South American Defense Council (SDC), within the frame-
work of the Union of South American Nations (UNASUR), a south Ameri-
can integration project that was created in 2008, starting from the signature 
of UNASUR Constitutive Treaty, and which had as signatories twelve south 
American countries: Argentina, Bolivia, Brazil, Chile, Colombia, Ecuador, 
Guyana, Paraguay, Peru, Suriname, Uruguay and Venezuela.
 Since its creation, the SDC boosted the debate regarding its objectives 
and its own nature. Thus, for example, during the process of “articulation and 
negotiation” of the Council, at least three visions about these objectives came 
up: the vision advocated by the Brazilian government, which “defended that 
the SDC articulated measures for the creation and the strengthening of mu-
tual confidence, for the exchange of military personnel in formation and […] 
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the defense industrial integration” (Abdul-Hak 2013, 20); the vision defended 
by the Venezuelan government, which “pointed out to its insecurity sense 
concerning extra-regional threats, defending an alliance of collective defense” 
(Abdul-Hak 2013, 20); and the Colombian government’s vision, which “insist-
ed in the treatment, within the scope of a potential SDC, of the combat to the 
narco-guerrilla and terrorism” (Abdul-Hak 2013, 20).
 More than a discussion about the objectives of a SDC, the established 
debate reflects the controversies that were present between the different south 
American countries regarding the model itself of the regional defense and 
security system that was intended for South America. It cannot be forgotten 
that, especially from World War II on, the whole South America was inte-
grated to the North American project of defense and security for the region, 
undermining, in this sense, the importance of the south American particular-
ities to the detriment of a “geostrategic and geo-economics conception of the 
Americas as only one continent”, “led” by the United States (Cabral 2010, 2).
 If this historical heritage of South America’s relationship with the US 
stands as an obstacle to the proposal of a “defense and security regional sys-
tem”, capable of being articulated from the South American countries’ his-
torical particularities and not necessarily from an “universal agenda” based 
on predominant interests of a global power (which is the case of the US), it is 
necessary to note, also, that the constitution of UNASUR itself, integrating all 
South America’s countries, does not stand for a homogenizing vision of the 
region. Thus, for example, while in the Andean region “the presence of polit-
ical, territorial and economic antagonisms involving neighbor countries such 
as Colombia, Ecuador and Venezuela had been producing latent animosities, 
putting at stake the regional stability” (Rodrigues 2015, 2) in the Southern 
Cone region, there is no historical record of this kind of antagonism and con-
flict.
 Therefore, it is in this sense, that this article resulted from an inves-
tigation that aimed at analyzing not only the different visions of regional se-
curity systems present among UNASUR signatories countries, but, mainly, 
which model of RSC has become hegemonic in the historical process that 
resulted in the creation of the SDC.
 It is important to bear in mind that, still during the 20th century, the 
studies about Regional Security Systems have achieved a prominent position 
in the international context. The military operations that happened in World 
War II made possible the elaboration of regional concepts in the security 
scope, also permitting that other military operations and political actions were 
developed within the framework of local and regional particularities. During 
the Cold War, the subjects related to the collective security system, represent-
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ed by the United Nations (UN), were conditioned to the superpowers and 
to the state-members influence in the Security Council (SC). Besides, as the 
world was divided in two great blocs, the regional systems were influenced 
by such bipolarity, and, as result, the main regional actors had only a relative 
degree of strategical freedom (Cabral 2010).
 Hence, it was only in the last decades of the 20th century that the re-
gional dimension gained prominence in international relations. If, in a first 
moment, the end of the Cold War was interpreted as a terminal crisis of the 
bipolar system and as “the possibility of the instauration of a unipolar system 
led by the US, being this the only power with global strategic capability” (Vi-
gevani, Correa and Cintra 1998, 4), the posterior events contributed to the 
US-led unipolar thesis to remain only as a theoretical possibility (Vigevani, 
Correa and Cintra 1998, 4).
 These aspects of the international conjuncture contributed, in the 
scope of the theoretical discussion about defense and security, to the emer-
gence of the Regional Security Complex Theory (RSCT). A theory which 
defines the RSC as “a set of units whose major processes of securitization, 
desecuritization, or both are so interlinked that their security problems can-
not reasonably be analyzed or resolved apart from one another” (Buzan and 
Waever 2003, 44).
 Particularly regarding integration in the area of defense and security 
arising from the negotiations involving UNASUR, the discussion on the RSC 
model gains importance not only because of the peculiarities of the region 
and its historical relationship with the United States but, also, due to the polit-
ical changes that, since 2000, have occurred in practically all Latin American 
countries. It shall be considered, still, that South America does not constitute 
a homogenous bloc, whose countries have the same characteristics and face 
the same problems. Although the historical situation of economic depend-
ence may represent an approximation point, the historical rivalries, the po-
litical presence of organized crime, the internal violence (resulting from traf-
ficking-related crimes, from corruption, from poverty and from inequality), 
the presence of indigenous movements in the Andes and in Amazonia, the 
amazon region and its international importance, etc., make of South America 
a complex region, marked by regional and national singularities, turning it 
difficult the elaboration (and the execution) of a common integration agenda 
in the areas of security and defense.
 In this context, the creation of UNASUR itself and the related SDC, 
which had Brazil as a protagonist country (Cabral 2010), met the interests of 
Brazilian governments from the 2000s on strengthening integration process-
es among Latin American countries, establishing relations with other coun-
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tries in a South-South perspective, opposing to unilateralism and supporting 
multilateralism, but also, through leadership in the region, to project itself in-
ternationally, affirming itself, therefore, as a relevant regional actor, capable of 
occupying leadership positions in the international forums (Dias et al. 2015).
 In this sense, the different aspects of Latin America’s recent conjunc-
ture, with an emphasis in the direction given to the foreign policy by Brazilian 
governments from the 2000s on, highlight the importance of comprehend-
ing which conception of RSC oriented the concrete experience of the creation 
of UNASUR and, particularly, of its SDC.
The RSCT: concept and comparative analysis of the 
South-American RSC
The adoption of cooperative measures among countries with objec-
tives specially connected to defense and security shows itself as important and 
necessary in order to guarantee regional stability, to avoid potential threats 
which may bring insecurity levels not witnessed previously; but also, in order 
to international insertion projects of a group of countries gain more visibility 
and more respectability in an international context (Pagliari 2009).
 Also within this context of integration projects building among coun-
tries, the discussions regarding “regionalism” became more relevant, once 
the countries – specially those directly involved in regional integration pro-
jects – paid more attention to their geographical surroundings, also as a way 
to amplify its voice in the international community, making it possible, thus, 
the maximization of its insertion in the international scenario. As states 
Pagliari (2009), “regionalism” “[…] provided a greater space of autonomy, so 
that regions themselves could focus on their security agendas […]” (Pagliari 
2009, 13).
 As a result, the studies about Regional Security Systems gained more 
importance in the international scene, particularly in the last decades of the 
f century, even though, in a Cold War context, issues related to security sys-
tems remained conditioned to the superpowers and to the influence of the 
UN Security Council’s states-members. In this way, due to the fact that the 
International System (IS) was classified as bipolar, due to the influence of two 
great blocs – the capitalist and the socialist –, the regional systems remained 
subject to such polarization, which limited regional actors’ strategic freedom 
(Cabral 2010).
 With the end of the Cold War, the emergence of regional security 
projects permitted the occurrence of some changes in the analysis of glob-
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al security systems, since the end of bipolarity represented a transformation 
in international security related issues and needed adjustments, in order to 
avoid the rise of new global conflicts. Moreover, it was from that period on 
that the deepening and the integration of many regions were strengthened 
through mutual confidence in the areas of security and economic and social 
development (Cabral 2010).
 In this context, the RSCT emerges, being a result of a theoretical con-
struction connected to the Copenhagen School, more specifically, to two in-
ternational relations theorists: Barry Buzan (1946 -) and Ole Waever (1960-). 
The Copenhagen School was born in the 1980s, in a context of rising con-
cerns, in the whole Europe, about the subjects related to security and defense. 
From then on, it became a reference in international security, owing much of 
it to the theoretical production of these authors. In spite of the school focus-
ing its studies in European security, the authors embrace regional security of 
the whole planet (Nobre 2013).
 Buzan and Waever have the merit of building an analysis about secu-
rity and defense in the IS context that presupposes that geographical proximi-
ty facilitates the generation of common interests between different countries; 
highlighting, then, the geography as an important dimension in international 
relations dynamics, from which arises the argument that it is not possible to 
comprehend the security and defense dynamics in the international level and 
in post-Cold War period without considering the phenomenon of regionaliza-
tion.
 Furthermore, Buzan, since the 1990s, insists that the end of the Cold 
War did not only boosted a greater interest (political and theoretical) in the se-
curity and defense related issues, but also that military security does not stand 
anymore at the top of the agenda, signaling, still, that the issues related to 
the historical comprehensiveness of regional identities became more relevant 
(Fagundes 2014). In this sense, it is important to bear in mind that the Co-
penhagen School not only enhanced a greater discussion about security and 
regionalization, but also contributed to, in the scope of security and defense, 
new dimensions gain more visibility.
 The RSCT aims at explaining why states engage in relations of coop-
eration and reciprocity. According to its formulators, the theory derives either 
from the anarchical relations established among the composing structures 
and its balance of power, or from the pressure existent due to the geographical 
proximities. Hence, we may affirm that the RSCT fits within the framework 
of reciprocal relations sought by the states and seeks to comprehend how it 
occurs the securitization processes’ dynamics in the IS (Cardoso 2010).
 Buzan and Waever defend that the theory was developed in order to 
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explain that the regional level is the most proper one to undertake a security 
analysis. The core argument is that there are  two extremities to analyze secu-
rity: the national and the global. The national security per se does not represent 
a level of analysis which may be considered as significant, given that security 
is a relational phenomenon. According to the authors, “[…]no nation’s securi-
ty is self-contained” (Buzan and Waever 2003, 43). The global security, on the 
other hand, is a state which the countries aim to achieve; thus, it is not a “real 
phenomenon”, since the IS is not integrated in security terms. Differently, 
in a determinate region, defense and security become more important, seen 
that a country’s security does not occur in isolation, without considering the 
region itself. In this way, the regional level is where national and global level 
interact and where the great majority of actions take place.
 Teixeira (2013), whereas analyzing Buzan’s and Waever’s studies, jus-
tifies this bigger interaction between national and global security in a regional 
level with the argument that there is a greater detachment of the great powers 
in local and regional conflicts, due to the great expenses involved in these 
kind of disputes. Thus, “local logistics favors regional rather than global rela-
tions as the interactions between neighbors are more relevant in the political 
calculation of security than the global relations […]” (Teixeira 2013, 5).
 This fact confirms what Buzan and Waever (2003) describe in their 
theory: that the securitization processes and, therefore, the interdependence 
levels in the area of security are more intense and better perceived among 
states of the same RSC rather than the interaction of these states with others 
that are not in the same complex or that are even more distant from them.
 The RSCT seeks to interpret the post-Cold War polarity system and 
how it works in the IS, where there is the presence of diverse regions, formed 
by states and whose main difference lays in the security aspect. Besides, this 
theory aims at making a distinction between the interaction level of the great 
powers, which are capable to transmit their power through long distances, 
and the smaller ones, that is, those powers whose power transmission capa-
bility and whose security dynamics remain restricted to the region in which 
they are inserted (Fuccille and Rezende 2013).
 Even though we may observe the influence of great powers within 
regions, the remarkability reached by the RSC after the end of the Cold War is 
owed to the changes in the international security pattern, which became more 
flexible, opposing, thus, to the pattern that was followed between the years of 
1945 and 1991 (Buzan and Waever 2003). In this sense, we may affirm that 
the fact of states being inserted within a RSC presupposes a maximization of 
security of each one of them, since these units and, consequently, their secu-
rity issues find themselves interconnected. 
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 The security concept brought by Buzan and Waever has a great im-
portance in international security and regionalization in security IS related 
studies. It cannot be forgotten that the importance given to regionalism and 
its security were not limited to military and warlike issues, since the emer-
gence of “new issues” (considered by International Relations theorists as 
equally important to the dynamics of the international scenario) allowed the 
global delineation of new kinds of threats. Among these new threats, we may 
mention the environmental issues, the terrorism, the drug-trafficking, the ex-
treme poverty and the disordered population growth (Fagundes 2012).
 According to Teixeira, it is in the regional level that the relationships 
among states become more powerful, even though the region is connected to 
the global sphere – being such relationship also considered important for its 
development and its consequent projection in the international scene. It is 
necessary, therefore, to construct a security environment where conflicts may 
be solved and threats pushed away, in order to make the cooperation among 
members which constitute determinate regional integration organization fea-
sible, as well as the distribution of attributions in defense and security politics 
(Teixeira 2013).
 It is important, therefore, to affirm that the RSC seek to comprehend 
how securitization processes in the IS work and are established through a 
regionalist approach (Fuccille and Rezende 2013). A securitization process 
presupposes a series of emergency measures taken by a state in order to solve 
problems that may threat national interest or even the survival of such state 
in the IS. In this case, those measures may be justified as “exception actions, 
as human efforts and extraordinary budgets, to the consecution of public pol-
itics, restrictions on consecrated rights e unusual rising of secret and confi-
dentiality procedures” (Cardoso 2010, 28-29).
 The securitization process occurs, for example, in sectors like the mil-
itary and the political and has as its function the protection of IS’ actors. Thus, 
the security relationships have as a characteristic the way in which measures 
will be taken in order to balance potential threats (Cardoso 2010).
 According to Buzan and Waever (2003), in a RSC, the processes that 
cover it are interconnected, hindering, then, an independent analysis and un-
derstanding of the security problems faced by the countries that compose 
it.  However, even though all the issues involving security related problems 
refers to a determinate region, the IS and its polarity continue to interfere; 
in other words, the events that permeate the international scene and that in-
fluence in the decision-making process of the RSC should also be taken into 
consideration (Fuccille and Rezende 2013).
 From these considerations, a RSC may be conceptualized as “a set of 
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units whose major processes of securitization, dessecuritization, or both are 
so interlinked that their security problems cannot reasonably be analysed or 
resolved apart from one another” (Buzan and Waever 2003, 44).
 The RSCs have their definition based on amity and enmity patterns, 
which end up forming the security interdependence patterns geographically 
defined. Furthermore, the particular characteristic of each Complex is directly 
linked to the historical pattern of its components, as, for example, the history 
of enmities between countries and even military, economic or cultural part-
ners (Buzan and Waever 2003).
 For a group of countries to be considered as a RSC, it is necessary that 
its interdependence degree is enough either to consider it as an interconnect-
ed set, either for it to be differentiated from the others in security terms. In 
Buzan’s and Waever’s words, “RSCs define themselves as substructures of 
the international system by the relative intensity of security interdependence 
among a group of units, and security indifference between that set and sur-
rounding units” (Buzan and Waever 2003, 48).
 The authors explain that the idea of the security interdependence be-
ing focused on the regional level derives from the power of the units, that is, 
in the capacity that a determinate state has to establish more or less security 
around the world. The superpowers tend to spread their security relation-
ships all around the world, not fitting, therefore, in the logic of geography and 
proximity. The smaller states, on the other hand, possess limited capabilities, 
which diminish its security relationships with closer neighbors, strengthen-
ing the regional, differently from the great powers, that end up undermining 
the regional.
 The logic between global powers’ distribution of capabilities and the 
dynamics of a RSC is within the so-called penetration, as explained below:
Penetration occurs when outside powers make security alignments with 
states within an RSC [...]. Balance-of-power logic works naturally to encour-
age the local rivals to call in outside help [...]. Such linkage between the local 
and global security patterns is a natural feature of life in an anarchic system 
(Buzan and Waever 2003, 46-47).
 In this case, the RSCT tends to limit the role of great powers, so that 
local factors receive the required weight regarding an analysis in terms of 
security. Thus, “the standard form for an RSC is a pattern of rivalry, balance 
of power, and alliance patterns among the main powers within the region: 
to this pattern can then be added the effects of penetrating external powers” 
(Buzan and Waever 2003, 47).
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 Seen that, the essential structure of the RSC may be identified, which 
has four variables: the borders, which differentiate one regional complex from 
another; the anarchical structure, that is, a RSC must be composed by two or 
more autonomous units; the polarity, that is, how the power is distributed 
among the complex’s units; and the social construction, which indicates the 
pattern of amity or enmity among the units (Buzan and Waever 2003). It is 
important to highlight, also, that there are different patterns in the relation-
ship between states, emerging, then, two poles: the chaos, which refers to the 
enmity pole, and the amity pole, that is, the one of the security community 
(Medeiros Filho 2010). About this issue, it is also important to mention that:
[…] the security relations between states (usually neighbors) would be, in 
a greater extent, determined by the mutually perceived threat/fear pattern 
[…] the patterns may vary from a conflicting relation (power politics) to an 
amity model (political convergence). Between these two extremities, rising 
order of amity, Buzan suggests as intermediate patterns the coexistence 
and the cooperation (Medeiros Filho 2010, 57; own translation).
 It is important to note that Buzan and Waever define two basic types 
of RSC based on the optical of power distribution, 1) the standard RSC; 2) 
the centred RSC, being this latter subdivided in unipolar centered in a great 
power, unipolar centered in a great power or when the region becomes an ac-
tor itself due to its elevated degree of institutionalization (Buzan and Waever 
2003).
 The standard RSC has as its main characteristic the absence of a pow-
er with action in a global level within the complex. As a result, the rules ap-
plied to the composing states, or even to allow the entrance of global powers 
in the complex, are defined by the relations among the states that are part of 
that same complex. Besides, in a standard complex, the polarity will be exclu-
sively defined by the member-states, varying from uni to multipolar (Buzan 
and Waever 2003).
 On the other hand, in a centred RSC, there is a power with global 
action, which may concentrate the majority of the existent capabilities in the 
complex. This power may be a great power, a superpower or even an institu-
tion (Buzan and Waever 2003). According to Fuccille and Rezende (2013), the 
theorists suggest the inclusion of an extra option in the centred RSC category, 
since they cannot classify it within any other; such option refers to a unipolar 
centred RSC, when a regional power cannot be considered as a great power in 
a global level.
 Finally, and following the description of what is a RSC, one may note 
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the fact that South America is free from nuclear threats, being considered 
as a security region, once it can be observed the interdependence among the 
countries that compose the region and that, as a consequence, that the region 
forms a RSC, since the interactions between them constitute themselves as a 
security pattern.
Possibilities and limits of a South American RSC model
The analysis presented by Buzan and Waever regarding the RSC is 
greatly respected among researchers and scholars that study defense and se-
curity related issues in integration processes among countries not only due to 
the emphasis attributed to the regional dimension, but also due to the pres-
entation of different RSC models, contemplating the south American expe-
rience.
 More recently, however, and from UNASUR’s constitution on, some 
authors that occupied themselves with the defense and security issues in inte-
gration projects among Latin American countries have sought to discuss the 
reach of Buzan’s and Waever’s analysis regarding South America’s RSC.
 It is the case, for example, of Alexandre Fuccille and Lucas Pereira 
Rezende, who analyze the RSC in South America, in a dialogue with Buzan’s 
and Waever’s proposal, show not only the limitations in their theory, but also, 
some outdated conceptions in the model proposed by Copenhagen School’s 
theorists.
 Fuccille and Rezende seek to update descriptions of polarity in South 
America, as well as to discuss the Brazilian protagonism and the “current-
ly active institutions with potential securitization profile” in the region, de-
fending that the role of Brazil as a protagonist in South America makes the 
South-American RSC one first model of centred RSC, despite the absence of a 
nation with global leadership:
[...] being unipolar in the region, and from a protagonist role agreed upon 
by the United States of America (USA) at a global level, although faltering, 
Brazil has a role of centralizing the two South American subcomplexes, the 
North-Andean and the one of the Southern Cone. This makes the RSC to 
be described as centred, with the unipolar power not being a global power, 
inaugurating, then, a first empirical case of such kind of RSC (Fuccille and 
Rezende 2013, 78; own translation).
 
The Brazilian protagonism in South America, according to Fuccille 
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and Rezende, has different implications for the configuration of the RSC in 
South America. The first of these implications is strictly connected to the 
description of a RSC and refers to the Brazilian condition in the region, that, 
in spite of not being a power in the global scenario, dominates the regional 
security dynamics:
It becomes necessary, then, in order to comprehend the proper categoriza-
tion of South America’s RSC, to observe whether Brazil, as a unipolar pow-
er, thrives to dominate the security dynamics of the region. Our hypothesis 
[…] is that yes. And this is due to two reasons: (1) having its position relative-
ly diminished in US’ priority agenda, South America becomes more free to 
explore the regional security dynamics. As the US penetration gets smaller 
therefore, arises the possibility of a great protagonism of new actors. Such 
protagonism is, however, compromised, since the global level continues 
to influence the RSC; (2) from this consented autonomy, Brazil starts to 
exert a great protagonism in the RSC, bringing the security agendas of both 
subcomplexes even closer (Fuccille and Rezende 2013, 85; own translation).
 According to the authors, the creation of UNASUR and of its SDC, 
besides of Venezuela’s entry into MERCOSUL as a full member, shifts the 
possibility of an institutional cohesion in the region (now centered in UNAS-
UR), opening up greater possibilities for Brazil, from UNASUR, to play the 
leading role in creating a security community involving all South American 
countries (Fuccille and Rezende 2013, 85). Thus:
[…] these two factors contribute to the possibility of delimitating a change 
in the South American RSC, but not towards a division of the region in two 
distinct subcomplexes, as sustained by Buzan and Waever (2003); rather, 
towards a centred RSC, with Brazil assuming the unipolar role. This would 
qualify South America’s RSC as the only category that these authors pres-
ent, but do not identify any case: a RSC centred in which the pole is not a 
great global power. However, although centred, it is an instable RSC, due to 
Brazil’s hesitant performance as the center […]. (Fuccille and Rezende 2013, 
85-86; own translation).
 The analysis made by Fuccille and Rezende is based in a set of as-
sumptions, from which they do not categorically affirm a Brazilian protago-
nism in South America, but, rather, the importance of the Brazilian protago-
nism in order to consolidate a South American RSC. In this sense, some of 
the assumptions ought to be listed in order to later advance in a discussion 
regarding the conditions and possibilities of a RSC in South America.
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 A first assumption is related to the changes that took place from the 
last decades of the 20th century on, namely, changes in Americas’ security 
model that predominated in the Cold War period and in which the US re-
mained as fully hegemonic. The end of this period, a “growing disengage-
ment of the US in the region”, as well as North American new priorities in 
the post-September 11 period, “ended up consolidating an imaginary in South 
America of a possible geographical space and capable of developing more 
independent policies, as a result of a greater autonomy margin” (Fuccille and 
Rezende 2013, 86).
 The rise of left-wing governments in South America, alongside with 
the alterations in the international security agenda in the “post-September 
11”, created favorable conditions for actions aiming at the establishment of a 
South American RSC to make sense in the beginning of the 21st century. It 
was from these transformations on that, during the government of Fernando 
Henrique Cardoso in Brazil (1995-2002), but, mainly, from the rise of Luís 
Inácio Lula da Silva (2003) to the Brazilian government, South American gov-
ernments walked towards the creation of UNASUR and, through it, the insti-
tutionalization of a SDC (Fuccille and Rezende 2013, 87).
 Over the process of discussion and institutionalization of UNASUR 
and its SDC, different issues were raised, not only by Brazil, but also having 
Brazil as a protagonist: the issue of drug-trafficking in the region, the sub-re-
gional conflicts (Peru and Ecuador), the interest in obstructing the “Bolivarian 
impulses”, the interest in avoiding an “arms race” in the region, the consoli-
dation of the South Atlantic as a region of peace – free of nuclear weapons and 
important for the Brazilian projection in the IS –, the resistance to the mate-
rialization of a development policy in the region led by the US, the Brazilian 
interest in consolidating a foreign policy with new directions (South-South 
relations), focusing more in the South American integration (Fuccille and 
Rezende 2013).
 It was based on this perspective that, according to Fuccille and 
Rezende, a dynamic of integration was consolidated, having UNASUR as the 
objectification of such dynamic, which walks toward the formation of an “only 
RSC”, a centered model, insofar as Brazil (though with frailties) thrives to 
aggregate the two South American subcomplexes:  
Brazil’s unipolarity in South America implies a centred RSC, whether the 
country assumes the position of guarantor of this or not. It is in this point 
that one [RSC] differs from a security community: for the first one, there is 
no need to exist harmonious relationships, as long as the security dynamics 
of the region are centered in one actor. Even though sometimes […] Bra-
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zil lacks maturity as the guarantor of regional institutions, all of the main 
regional security dynamics have, somehow, passed under Brazilian aegis 
(Fuccille and Rezende 2013, 93; own translation).
 Regardless of that, the discussion about the possibilities of consoli-
dating a South American RSC – whose roots may be found in the establish-
ment of the Brazilian hegemony in the region, as presented by Fuccille and 
Rezende – sheds light in the existent frailties that difficult such project to take 
place, being these derived either from latent issues in South America, either 
from issues that gained visibility in the last years, especially those regarding 
the crisis of the left-wing projects, which, in the beginning of the 2000s, have 
risen to the national governments.
 On the other hand, it might be equally important to mention that, 
from the second decade of the 21st century on, political ruptures can be ob-
served in different South American countries, pointing out to a crisis in the 
period of left-wing governments in the region and to the rise of political and 
social forces committed to a neoliberal political and ideological orientation.
 This period of ruptures and/or discontinuities in South America be-
gan with the destitution of Fernando Lugo from the Paraguayan presidency, 
in 2012, in a process that, although considered as legit by the juridical au-
thorities of the country, was condemned and considered as illegitimate by 
the Inter-American Commission on Human Rights, creating an international 
diplomatic crisis among the South American countries that are members of 
MERCOSUR and UNASUR – whose members, in its great majority, refused 
to accept the destitution of Lugo from the Paraguayan presidency.
 In sequence, the death of Hugo Chávez, in 2013, and the political (and 
economic) crisis faced by Venezuela since then, the election of Maurício Macri 
in Argentina as President of the Republic and, especially (due to the Brazilian 
protagonism), the impeachment of Dilma Rousseff in Brazil, in 2016, sym-
bolized the crisis of the development projects that guided governmental poli-
tics in many of the South American countries from the 2000s on, committed 
to the reduction of social inequalities, to a greater economic integration of 
the popular social classes and the laborers, to regional integration processes 
capable of consolidating a South-South perspective; moreover, they expressed 
changes in the national governments’ politics, now more with more affinity 
with the neoliberal perspective. More than a crisis in the development pro-
jects, the aforementioned events marked the possibility of a new period in 
South America, with a greater alignment with North American (especially the 
US) and European countries.
 The transformations occurred in Brazil since the impeachment of 
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Dilma Rousseff, with its respective repercussions in the country’s foreign 
policy, are certainly an important conditioning, due to the representation that 
Brazil has in South America, for the analysis not only of the (future) dynamics 
of UNASUR and its Defense Council, and of the possibilities of setting up a 
South American RSC (with Brazil as the main country); but also for a better 
understanding of the limits and difficulties that have arisen, since its origin, 
in the discussion and implementation of regional defense and security poli-
cies in South America.
The South-American Defense Council
As previously mentioned, the South-American continent does not 
face conflicts of great proportion, neither direct enemies that may threat its 
security. From the end of the Cold War on and since the re-democratization 
process, the Brazilian Armed Forces live in a historical condition in which its 
functions are not well defined, seen that, on one hand, there is internal resist-
ance regarding its intervention in the public security and, on the other hand, 
the presence of external enemies in the region remains distant not only from 
Brazil, but also from South America (Abdul-Kak 2013).
 The regional integration is one of the factors that contribute to en-
hance confidence among countries that belong to a same region, being able, 
then, to reduce the number of conflicts and to ensure that solutions to poten-
tial controversies are negotiated and resolved in a peaceful manner.
 In this sense, UNASUR shows itself as an important organ when it 
comes to security and defense in South America. Not only for standing as an 
instance of political discussion among South-American countries, but also 
and because, in its own constitution, proposes that the member-states shall 
articulate joint actions, exchanging information and experiences in defense 
matters, as well as establishing combat strategies to possible terrorist actions, 
to arms and drug-trafficking, to the non-proliferation of nuclear weapons and 
weapons of mass destruction, to the transnational organized crime, etc. It is 
interesting to observe, in this sense, about defense within the scope of UNAS-
UR that:
[…] the aim is not to achieve integration in defense, but rather to establish 
the exchange of information and experiences in defense matters, what can 
be seen as a first step to construct a common thought, being such thought 
capable of providing a basis for the common strategic formulation, imply-
ing, if and when achieved, a greater autonomy of the region in defense 
issues (Mathias and Matijascic 2011, 237; own translation).
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This is, therefore, one of the guidelines that oriented the creation 
of the SDC itself within the scope of UNASUR. A Council that was created 
during a meeting of the Council of Heads of State and of Government of 
UNASUR, taking place in Salvador, in December 16 of 2008. On this occa-
sion, apart from the SDC, other Councils were created, as well as Working 
Groups, aiming at a better coordination of the work dynamics in UNASUR 
(Unasul 2008a).
 Brazil had a differentiated importance in the creation of the SDC, 
being considered as its biggest advocate. However, one must consider that the 
creation of the SDC, within the framework of the discussions that resulted in 
the creation of UNASUR, had its normative benchmark based in three Presi-
dential Declarations, which resulted from meetings with the objective of cre-
ating an integrative agreement between South-American countries: 1) The Po-
litical Declaration of MERCOSUR, Bolivia and Chile, of 1999, which resulted 
in the creation of a “Zone of Peace”; 2) The Declaration on the South-Amer-
ican Zone of Peace, which resulted from the Second Meeting of Presidents 
of South America, of July 2002, and was ratified by Resolution of the United 
Nations’ General Assembly, in November of the same year; 3) The Declaration 
of San Francisco de Quito on the Establishment and Development of an An-
dean Peace Area, of July 2004, ratified by a Resolution of the UN’s General 
Assembly, in December of the same year (Abdul-Hak 2013, 140).
 The result of this discussion process became materialized in the First 
Conference of Defence Ministers of the South-American Community, which 
took place in 2006 and whose commitments were based on:
[…] the development of information and intelligence exchange mecha-
nisms, academic exchange, capacitation and training actions, exchange 
of experiences and scientific and technological knowledge regarding the 
industry of defence, and the realization of bilateral or multilateral meet-
ings among the members of the South American Ministries of Defence 
(Abdul-Hak 2013, 140).  
 In 2006, within the scope of UNASUR, the security and defense re-
lated issues were already on the agenda and, moreover, the importance of a 
“regional security doctrine” was already thought of, as well as the creation of 
some responsible institutional instance.
 Possibly, in the discussion of the own constitution of UNASUR, a 
series of demands regarding defense and security were being made by the 
representatives of South American countries. Demands as the ones indicated 
by Medeiros Filho: “maintenance of peace and democracy in the countries of 
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the region, construction of a South-American geopolitical identity, combat to 
organized crime and creation of a regional defense market” (Medeiros Filho 
2009, 3).
 It is interesting to note that, in the documents available at UNASUR’s 
Digital Repository, the discussions of the year of 2007, aiming at the Constitu-
tion of UNASUR, defense and security did not have a significant place. This, 
evidently, does not mean that the matter was not being discussed. Regardless 
of that, it is only in the register of an Extraordinary Meeting of Heads of State 
and of Government of UNASUR, which occurred in May 23 of 2008, that 
one may find an explicit reference to the subject. In such Meeting, the then 
President of Brazil, Luís Inácio Lula da Silva, proposed to establish the SDC, 
when, then, was suggested the creation of a Working Group (WG) to analyze 
the proposal of the Brazilian President. The protocol from that meeting reg-
isters that the proposal for the creation of a WG was expressively backed up 
“by some countries and was finally approved” (Unasul 2008b), registering, 
still, that the President of Colombia, although agreeing with the creation of 
the WG, affirmed that its country could not participate of the initiative, “given 
the current circumstances derived from the terrorist phenomenon” in that 
country (Unasul 2008b).
 The potential non-participation of Colombia in the WG that was estab-
lished to discuss the creation of a SDC was not confirmed. The protocol of the 
XIII Meeting of the of the Council of Delegates of UNASUR, that took place 
in Santiago of Chile, in August 11 and 12 of 2008, registers that the WG on 
the SDC had already made two meetings, with the presence of all UNASUR’s 
members and with the official incorporation of Colombia (Unasul 2008c).
 The issue is that the WG established to discuss the creation of the 
SDC, which, by August of 2008 had already have two meetings, advanced sig-
nificantly in the discussions, in such a way that, in a meeting that took place 
in Santiago of Chile, in December 11, the Statute of the Council was approved. 
Such Statute would also be approved by the Council of Heads of State and of 
Government of UNASUR, in its Third Ordinary Meeting, gathered in Brazil, 
in December 16 of that same year.
 The approved Statute of the SDC has 18 articles, versing about five 
themes: 1. Nature; 2. Principles; 3. Objectives; 4. Structure; and 5. Function-
ing (Unasul 2008d).
 Regarding the nature of the SDC, the same is considered as a “consult, 
cooperation and coordination instance in defense matters”. Therefore, within 
the functioning structure of UNASUR, the Council does not have deliberative 
power, constituting itself in a space of discussion, of exchange of information, 
of cooperation in the area of defense, as later indicated in the presentation of 
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its objectives (Unasul 2008d).
 In what concerns the principles of the SDC, its Statute, in its articles 
second and third, affirms its subjection to the principles and purposes estab-
lished in the Charter of the United Nations, to the Charter of the Organiza-
tion of American States and to the mandates and decisions of the Council of 
Heads of State and of Government of UNASUR (Unasul 2008d).
 It is important to notice, also, that besides of the Council representing 
only a consultative organ within the scope of UNASUR (therefore, subordi-
nated to the superior instances of the institution, more specifically, to the 
Council of Heads of State and of Government of UNASUR), the principles of 
its Statute imply that the acting of UNASUR itself, in the defense field, does 
not always stand as a normative power towards the constituted national au-
thorities, that is, towards the rules, the legislations or even actions of national 
governments.
 Then, a situation emerges in which the Council has an advisory char-
acter, it is able to carry studies, to propose agreements and actions of coop-
eration, but its performance is limited by the own horizon of the integrative 
process. In the limit, it expresses principles and generic rules, without an 
auto-applying power and with limited capacity of interference in the mem-
ber-states, even if its internal political dynamics occur in conformity with 
the assumptions and the principles affirmed by the integrative agreements. 
As the history of integrative processes in South America shows, the national 
states are generally opposed to the transference of its prerogatives to the scope 
of integrative blocs (Almeida 2009).
 The Statute of the SDC defined some general objectives and a set of 
specific ones, aiming at delimitating its actions. As general objectives were 
defined:
a) To consolidate South America as a Zone of Peace, basis to the democratic 
stability and to the integral development of our peoples and as contribution 
to world peace.
b) To build a South-American identity in defense matter, which consid-
ers sub-regional and national characteristics and which contributes to the 
strengthening of Latin American and Caribbean unity.
c) To generate consensuses in order to strengthen regional cooperation in 
defense matter (Unasul 2008d; own translation).
The existence of eleven specific objectives, for its turn, allows us to 
consider at least three plans of action: the importance attributed in that mo-
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ment to the production and the sharing of information regarding defense and 
security; the necessity of formation plans (construction and socialization of 
knowledge) about defense and security; the cooperation in plans aiming at the 
development of the defense industry (including here the own modernization 
of the armed forces); the actions aimed at humanitarian disasters (natural ca-
tastrophes, especially); and the issue of gender, as an issue to be incorporated 
in the discussion about defense and security.
From the point of view of its structure, the SDC is composed by the 
Ministers of Defense (or its representatives) of UNASUR’s member coun-
tries. The national delegations are composed by high representatives of the 
Foreign Affairs and the Defense and by aids, being this latter present when 
considered important in the participation of the meetings by the state-mem-
bers.
The SDC has an executive instance, headed by Vice-Ministers of De-
fense (or equivalent). The presidency of the Council corresponds to the same 
country that occupies the presidency pro tempore of UNASUR, having as its 
responsibility “to coordinate the activities of the Council”. To be precise, the 
Statute of the Council, in its article 11, defines the attributions of its presiden-
cy as:
a) To assume the duties of the Council Secretariat and other working bod-
ies, including the communication with member-states and the sending of 
information of interest to the work of the Council.
b) To elaborate the agenda proposal and the organization of the works, to 
the ordinary and the extraordinary meetings of the South-American De-
fense Council, to be submitted to the other member-states.
c) To formulate, with previous consultation to the member-states, invita-
tions to specialists to take part in meetings of the South-American Defense 
Council (Unasul 2008d; own translation).
As it can be observed in the following figure, the SDC counts also with 
the Center for Strategic Defense Studies – CSDS, first permanent organ of 
the SDC. The CSDS was gestated in 2009, although its official creation has 
occurred only in 2011, in a conference regarding South American strategical 
positioning in 21st century. Its Statute was approved in the end of 2012, by the 
Council of Heads of State and of Government of UNASUR (Unasul 2012a). 
Its headquarters are located in Buenos Aires, in Argentina, and, as already 
pointed out, it was created with the expectative of “generating a strategical 
thought in the regional level”, capable of contributing to the coordination and 
harmonization of defense politics in South America. It is an organ committed 
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to the production and the diffusion of strategical knowledge in defense and 
security in the scope of UNASUR.
Figure 1 - Structure of the South-American Defense Council
Source: Barbosa 2016.
Still in what concerns the structure of the SDC, there is the South-Amer-
ican Defense School – ESUDE, from its Spanish name –, approved in Feb-
ruary of 2014 and created in August of the same year. ESUDE is a center of 
high studies, which has as its objective to capacitate civilians and military 
personnel in the areas of regional defense and security, in the political and 
strategical levels (Silva 2005). The creation of ESUDE met the expectations 
regarding the exchange between specialists of South-American countries, be-
sides of covenants between South-American institutions and universities. As 
affirmed by Fonseca, when referring to ESUDE, the same was configured as 
a “regional institutional space that, through the education and the research of 
regional subjects of common interest, will contribute to the construction and 
the diffusion of a South-American defense thought” (Fonseca 2014, 7; own 
translation).
 From the perspective of its functioning, the SDC, according to its Stat-
ute, summons ordinary meetings annually. Furthermore, the Council Agree-
ments are adopted by consensus (according to the article 12 of UNASUR’s 
Constitutive Treaty). The Executive Instance, however, gathers at each six-
month period, aiming at the elaboration of annual action plans of the Council. 
The Statute also highlights, regarding the functioning of the Council, that the 
incorporation of new state-members, as well as the cooperation dialogue with 
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other similar regional or sub-regional organizations, occurs accordingly to 
the determinations contemplated in UNASUR’s Constitutive Treaty (Unasul 
2008e).
Which Regional Security Complex: an analysis from the agenda 
of the South-American Defense Council of UNASUR
As previously mentioned, according to Buzan’s and Waever’s theoreti-
cal orientation, a RSC is formed based in the interdependence degree existent 
among a group of states, besides of geographical proximity and historical, 
economic and social factors present in each of these states. Thus, the cooper-
ation level experienced by a Complex will be greater as bigger is the interde-
pendence among its members, added to the consensus that must permeate 
the decisions in the interest areas of that Complex. 
 In the case of the South-American RSC, regarded from the experi-
ence of the SDC, the decisions made by its members in the areas of defense 
and security are based on consensus. Buzan and Waever would classify the 
South-American RSC as standard, given the absence of a power that acts in 
the global level within the IS; the power is defined in terms of regional polar-
ity, and the amity-enmity patterns may present itself as conflictive, security 
regimes or security communities.
 It is important to note that, in the moment of the analysis, Buzan and 
Waever also consider the existence of centred RSC, which they classify in dif-
ferent types: unipolar, having as a pole a great power; centered, but integrated 
by institutions, and not by a regional power. One shall still consider that the 
theorists that discuss the theory of the RSC identify another model of centred 
RSC: an “extra option”, “when there is an unipolar centred RSC, but the power 
is not a great power in the global scale” (Fuccille and Rezende 2013, 80; own 
translation).
 The experience of UNASUR, and also of its SDC, have already boosted 
a debate regarding the relevance or not of the theory developed by Buzan and 
Waever, more specifically, in the definition they propose to the South-Ameri-
can RSC. In this sense, Fuccille and Rezende, for example, have already ques-
tioned Buzan’s and Waever’s theory, stating that the South-American RSC 
defended by these authors is “limited, or even outdated, due to some mis-
understanding of the specific dynamics of the region” (Fuccille and Rezende 
2013, 77; own translation).
 In the analysis presented by Fuccille and Rezende, the RSC model for 
South America defended by Buzan and Waever cannot properly understand 
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the importance of Brazil for the region. According to Fuccille and Rezende, 
Brazil acts in South America as an “unipolar power” and “thrives to dominate 
the security dynamics in the region” (Fuccille and Rezende 2013, 85; own 
translation), in such a way that, for the South-American case, emerges a mod-
el “described as centered, in which the unipolar power is not a global power, 
inaugurating, thus, a first case of this type of RSC (Fuccille and Rezende 2013, 
78; own translation).
 So, this is the relevance of UNASUR and, especially, of the creation of 
the SDC, in which Brazil had a differentiated importance. Through UNASUR 
and the SDC, emerged a possibility for Brazil to exert a protagonism, being 
qualified as the “central actor of the RSC”, “exerting its regional hegemony 
through institutionalization and aggregation to a process of regional integra-
tion” (Fuccille and Rezende 2013, 85; own translation).
 It is important to date the text of these latter authors, written in 2013 
and, therefore, previously to the political and institutional crisis that resulted 
in the impeachment of President Dilma Rousseff (approved by the Brazilian 
Senate in August of 2016). An analysis that, in this sense, cannot contemplate 
– for evident reasons – not only the political and institutional instability that 
Brazil has been facing in the last two years, but also, the own transforma-
tions in the foreign policies adopted by the following government, presided 
by Michel Temer.
 In other words, one may not forget that, when UNASUR and the own 
SDC were created, Brazil was governed by Luís Inácio Lula da Silva, which lev-
eraged its projection in the international scenario with an affirmative foreign 
policy, with emphasis in the South-South relations and betting in integration 
processes involving countries outside of the axis US – Europe – Japan.
 This reverberated in the own acting of the country in South America, 
where Brazil effectively sought to be protagonist, achieving leadership in the 
integrative dynamics, as it is the case of UNASUR, in a perspective of unit-
ing both sub-complexes present in the region (the Southern Cone one and 
the Andean one). The acting of Brazil in that period, in such direction, also 
sought to affirm its interests of international projection, being illustrative, in 
this case, of its candidacy (in that context) to occupy one of the permanent 
seats of UN’s Security Council.
 The Brazilian political orientation in that period, thus, was driven by 
an interest of strengthening its leadership in South America, through a pro-
cess of integrative institutionalization, capable of projecting and assuring its 
political hegemony in the region, and by its interest in occupying a space 
of greater importance in the global context, either through already existent 
institutions and alongside with countries of greater political and economic 
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importance, either through the establishment of new relations, with countries 
located in different “southern” regions.
 These factors are important, including the discussion of issues (which 
point to some skepticism) brought by Fuccille and Rezende when analyzing 
UNASUR and the South-American RSC. The possibility of Brazil assuming 
a protagonist role in South America and, in this sense, standing as a Lat-
in-American “central actor of the RSC”, as noted by the authors, requires 
some conditions to be attended: that Brazil stands as a guarantor of stability 
in the region; that the bet in the development dimension (to the detriment of 
the strategical-military dimension) not only overcomes the limits of such bet, 
but also that the own strategy centered in the development reaches legitimacy 
(economic stability in the countries and in the region); that exists interest, in 
the Brazilian side, of exerting hegemony in the region (as the authors point, 
when referring to Buzan’s and Waever’s analysis, “a center not willing to be 
a center might give continuity to the regional instabilities in course”), even if 
Brazil sustains its desire to be a global player (Fuccille and Rezende 2013, 88; 
own translation).
 Evidently, one cannot deny the advances represented by the creation of 
UNASUR and, from within it, the creation of the SDC. An analysis of the SDC 
acting allows us to perceive a number of actions and discussions that express 
a virtuous historical process, consensually built from the consolidation of an 
institutional apparatus which allowed South-American countries to advance 
in the discussion regarding regional defense and security, including in a per-
spective of the construction of a defense and security community. Examples 
of these actions and advances are: the creation of the CSDS and of ESUDE, 
the Annual Action Plans of the SDC, the Declaration on the South-American 
Zone of Peace, the Proposal of Procedures for the Application of Measures to 
Promote Trust and Security, the numerous studies, diagnostics and prospect-
ing analysis that were made.
 It is necessary to notice, however, that the process of discussion and 
implementation of the SDC’s actions express a process that is still incipient, 
in which different issues still face distinct kinds of difficulties. Difficulties 
which are expressed, symbolically, in the change of designation of the own 
Declaration on the South-American Zone of Peace, initially a construction 
project of a protocol. Difficulties that were witnessed in the episode related to 
the dismiss of the Paraguayan President, when UNASUR, assuming a con-
sensual position of its members, positioned itself in favor of the thesis that 
occurred a constitutional rupture, but that, in the limit of its own nature as 
an integrative process, limited itself to temporarily alienate Paraguay, later 
spending efforts in order to diminish losses that such country may have had 
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when dismissed.
 Hence, the question (which South-American Security Complex?) may 
be answered, especially if taken into consideration the period which compre-
hends the creation of UNASUR until the impeachment of Dilma Rousseff 
(2016), from the own proposition defended by Alexandre Fuccille and Lucas 
Rezende: it is a centred model, with a unipolar power which does not exert 
global power. Nonetheless, this proposition, as the authors themselves as-
sume, has to be taken very cautiously, because:
The relative autonomy experienced by South America allows the Brazilian 
prominent role as an articulator of the security perceptions of both regional 
sub-complexes. The institutionalization of UNASUR and of the SDC con-
tributes to reaffirm Brazilian position in this process. The RSC of Latin 
America is of a centred model, but with a fragile center, and its stability 
depends on Brazil’s actuation as a stabilizing center […]. The question that 
remains, however, is: are we ready to assume those new responsibilities? 
(Fuccille and Rezende 2013, 95; own translation).
 All of this questioning becomes even more important in light of the 
changes that occurred from the impeachment of President Dilma Rousseff 
on. Since Rousseff’s dismiss, the new Brazilian government, from its begin-
ning, showed clearly that its priorities would not be the same as the ones 
that, until now, had oriented the actions of the country not only towards Latin 
America, but also towards other regions and countries of the planet. Docu-
ments made public by the Ministry of Foreign Affairs indicated that the new 
Brazilian leaderships have different points of discordance regarding the ori-
entations given from Lula’s government on, especially the underrating of re-
lations with central capitalist countries, fundamentally the US.
 In this moment, new questions ought to be posed. Although the 
US, through its recently elected governor, Donald Trump, have not openly 
declared changes concerning Latin America (thus implying that the region 
remains not being a priority), it is undeniable that, even in the analyzed peri-
od, the country kept a critical posture specially in what concerns the actions 
of governments that indicated a greater detachment from its interests (clearly 
regarding Venezuelan governments of Chávez and Maduro). In this sense, 
it is certain that, for that country, it is interesting that the South-American 
governments, as well as its integration experiences, do not represent a rup-
ture with North-American interests in the region, neither a strengthening of 
relation that, in global level, may represent a confrontation to its interests.
 Even if South America’s position remains small in North-American 
The Regional Security Complex of South America: an analysis from the South American 
Defense Council of UNASUR
278 Austral: Brazilian Journal of Strategy & International Relations
v.6, n.12, Jul./Dec. 2017 
priorities agenda, it is important to ask whether the political changes occurred 
in important South-American countries, especially in Argentina and in Brazil, 
with the rise of social and political forces which strengthened the neoliberal 
pattern of development adopted during the 1990s (aligned, therefore, with the 
interests of the international capital, represented by institutions such as the 
IMF and the World Bank), did not result in a renouncement by these coun-
tries to the protagonist role in the region. Is it possible to affirm, for example, 
that Brazil, in the post-PT governments period, is interested in maintaining a 
leadership in Latin America, in exerting protagonism in the South-American 
RSC? Is it possible to affirm that Brazil will keep betting in the approximation 
of security agendas between South-American countries, confirming its inter-
est in the institutionalization of integration projects with the South-American 
countries, or even with countries of other regions, located outside of the US 
– Europe – Japan axis? Even the complexity of the South-American countries’ 
reality in the recent period, either in its internal relations either in the rela-
tions among themselves (here, two events can be just mentioned: the disputes 
that occurred/occur in Ecuador and Venezuela, the former expressing a polit-
ical polarization and an already strong opposition to the guidelines assumed 
by the governments after the election of Rafael Correa; and the crisis in the 
relationship between Venezuela and MERCOSUR), will guarantee the availa-
bility and the sensibility demonstrated by the state-members of UNASUR, in 
the sense of maintaining the expectations of an integrative process and of the 
creation of a Security Community? And, in this sense, the own existence of 
UNASUR may be put at stake, because, although not abandoned, but rather 
placed in a position of “past project”, the participation of countries, or of some 
strategic countries (as it is the case of Brazil), may result in a process of rising 
weakening of its acting.
 The ending of this previous paragraph with an affirmation raises the 
possibility (and only the possibility, which means working with the hypothe-
sis) of, due to the recent events involving important South-American coun-
tries, of the effective affirmation of a historical reality in which both exist-
ent and relevant security sub-complexes in the region (Southern Cone and 
North-Andean) enhance its importance and, also, in which, within the scope 
of these two sub-complexes, the relations with the US gain new contours (the 
persistence of North-American interest in the Northern-Andean region, not 
only due to the drug-trafficking, but also due to the political and ideological 
orientation of the Venezuelan government; the possibility of a greater inte-
gration with the countries of MERCOSUR, in a perspective of great economic 
approximation).
 Regardless whether those questions lose historical meaning due to 
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the events of a future conjuncture, the issue is that, in a recent period, there 
are clear signs of the fact that the changes, especially in Brazil, put at stake 
UNASUR’s own objectives. The prominence assumed by Brazil in this inte-
gration process, in a moment in which the country faces a crisis that is not 
only political, but also economic, puts at risk different expectations created 
up to now. In this direction, as an example, one of the issues that may be put 
at stake is the one of the continuity of investments in South America aiming 
at the physical integration of the region, such as the case of the Initiative for 
the Integration of the Regional Infrastructure of South America (IIRSA), a 
project created in 2000, aiming at the development of joint actions (among 
South-American countries) of transportation, energy, and telecommunication 
infrastructure development. One may not forget that, since Lula’s govern-
ment, these projects depend on the financing of the Brazilian government, 
through the Brazilian Development Bank – BNDES, as well as Petrobrás, both 
in a recent period involved in denunciations of corruption and with a redefini-
tion of its investment policies. 
 Finally, starting from the affirmation that, in a RSC, the leader coun-
try (or leader countries) ought to live in a situation of stability, one cannot un-
dermine the crisis that Brazil has been facing in this latter period. Internally, 
besides of the corruption (involving almost all of the political parties and a 
significant number of political representatives that occupy elective positions, 
either in the Chamber of Deputies, either in the Senate) and the political 
and economic crisis, it is important to note that the country currently lives 
through a crisis of its own democracy, with different signs of the weakening 
of democratic institutions (certainly the most important is connected to the 
own democratic rupture represented by the impeachment of President Dilma 
and the set of reforms that, without the approval of the population that elected 
this President, its vice, now in the condition of President itself, is proposing 
and executing). Externally, it is at stake the possibility of continuing impor-
tant movements executed in the recent period, in a perspective of reaching 
a prominent space in the global power institutions (as illustrated by Brazil’s 
withdrawal from its interest in occupying a seat in UN Security Council)3.
3 Brazil has not presented a candidature in the last years for the occupation of a seat in the UN 
Security Council and, therefore, will not be a part of the referendum at least until 2033 (Folha de 
São Paulo 2017). Last modified on March 17. http://www1.folha.uol.com.br/mundo/2017/03/
1867280-brasil-ficara-de-fora-do-conselho-de-seguranca-da-onu-ao-menos-ate-2033.shtml.
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Final Considerations
 This article has analyzed the RSC implied in the discussions about 
defense and security in South America, more specifically, from the creation 
of the SDC, within the scope of UNASUR, on.
 The article has presented and analyzed the RSCT, especially in its 
version constructed by the theorists of the Copenhagen School, Buzan and 
Waever, through which was possible to indicate the main theoretical ques-
tions that oriented the analysis of the historical meaning of the creation and 
the actuation of the SDC.
 The discussions regarding the creation of UNASUR advanced during 
the first decade of the 21st century, until, in 2008, was signed the Constitutive 
Treaty of UNASUR. A treaty that, in the same line as presented in the pro-
posal of a Community of South-American Nations, affirmed, in its preamble, 
the commitment to the “shared and solidary history” of the South-American 
countries, characterizing these nations as multiethnic, pluri-lingual and mul-
ticultural; but also, the commitment to the creation of an integrated regional 
space in the political, economic, social, cultural, environmental and energetic 
dimensions, in the perspective of catalyzing the sustainable development in 
South-America, focused in the people’s well-being, in the multilateralism, in 
the balance, in the justice, in the equality, in the affirmation of a peace culture.
 From then on, the analysis had as its core the historical formation of 
the SDC and, especially, its structure and actuation, in the period that compre-
hended its creation, in 2008, and the year 2015. The analysis also presented 
its Statute (Nature, Principles, Objectives, Structure and Functioning) and its 
functioning structure.
 It was possible, thus, to reach a discussion regarding what is the RSC 
implied in the debate about defense and security in the South-American De-
fense Council. In this direction, it was affirmed that, effectively and from the 
analyzed experience in such period on, the studies affirmed a centred model, 
with an unipolar power that does not exert global power, objectified in the 
protagonism that Brazil assumed in the construction process of UNASUL. It 
was highlighted, nevertheless, the fragility of Brazil’s position in South Amer-
ica, the difficulties found in UNASUR’s own affirmation while an integration 
project among South-American countries and, mainly, how the more recent 
conjuncture, marked by ruptures in the political dynamics of important coun-
tries in the region, especially in Brazil, put at stake the own nature of the 
South-American RSC, and even the ways of continuing the integration project 
represented by UNASUR.
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 In this sense, this article presented one of its limits, given by the 
choice of a period of analysis that, although have not refused to contemplate 
aspects of changes occurred recently (especially in Brazil), have occupied it-
self, fundamentally, of what occurred until the end of 2015. New researches, 
thus, are not only important, but also necessary to a more precise analysis of 
the repercussions of this recent conjuncture in UNASUR, in the discussions 
regarding defense and security, and even in the South-American Regional 
Security Complex.
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ABSTRACT
This article is the result of an investigation into the model of Regional Security 
Complex (RSC model in South America, especially since the creation of the South 
American Defense Council (SDC), within UNASUR - Union of South American 
Nations. From a theoretical discussion on the Regional Security Complexes, it is 
argued that the recent South American experience affirmed an “extra type” model, 
since in its dynamics it is not identified a regional power that acts in a global level 
despite Brazilian’s greater economic expression in regional and international arena.
KEYWORDS
Union of South American Nations; Regional Security Complex; South American 
Defense Council.
Received on November 26, 2017.
Accepted on January 28, 2018.
Translated by Rafaela Elmir Fioreze
